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I Jere too the context seems to contaminate 
the form, only the misery here is the 
misery of happiness. . . an unhappiness 
that doesn't know its name, that has no 
way of telling itself apart from genuine 
satisfaction and fulfillment since it has 
presumably never encountered this last. 
- Fredric Jameson 
... if the moral force of liberalism is still 
stimulating, its sociological content is 
weak; it has no theory of society adequate 
to its moral aims. 
- C. Wright Mills 
I felt like destroying something beautiful. 
- "Jack," the narrator of Fight Club 
The banality of homo economicus 
produces homo brutalitas. 
- Michael Gillespie 
Introduction 
In an episode of Sat11rdqy Night Uve, the T.V. 
sensation IW'ho IW'a11ts To Be A Millio11aire? was 
treated satirically by replacing the usual middle 
class contestants with what were supposed to be 
poor peasants from some unnamed, developing 
country and having them compete for various food 
products rather than cash. As a female contestant 
answered the questions, she moved from a sack of 
rice to a block of cheese to a pile of meat while her 
husband rooted for her from the audience. he was 
finally stumped with a question that asked her to 
name a disease where young women intentionally 
starve themselves even though they have access to 
plentiful food. Incredulous, the contestant shook 
her head in disbelief and asked with genuine aston-
ishment how there could be such a disease. The 
satire asked Americans to look at themselves 
through the eyes of people for whom depravation 
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and hunger is a condition of existence and not a culturally induced psychological 
affliction. In other words, Americans were asked to acknowledge that they were 
different than much of the world but not in the exceptional way they typically 
imagine. It is this difference that serves as the starting point for this essay, though 
perhaps not in the way many would expect. My project aims not to condemn, 
shame, or celebrate American difference. Instead, my hope is to begin a much 
needed diaJogue that is necessitated by this difference, one that is taking place too 
infrequently within the American academy, among our social elites or within the 
culture at large. The reasons this conversation is not taking place arc manifold, but 
they tend to cohere around cultural embarrassment, indifference, ignorance, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the beneficiaries of the silence. Simply put, the conver-
sation that many Americans are not having is about what constitutes the good life 
in the American liberal context. Many Americans must reacquaint themselves in a 
serious and p11blic way with Emerson's question: " I Tow ought I to live?" (qtd. in 
Abbott 11). 
Post-Liberal not Post-Modern 
In the movie version of S. E. Hinton's novel Ri1111ble Fish, Mickey Rourke 
plays a misanthropic outlaw-genius known as the "Motorcycle Boy," of whom 
his drunken, classically-educated father (played by Dennis I lopper) says, " I Tc 
could be anything he wants, but just can't think of anything he wants to be." 
While not the most important problem in the world, nor perhaps even among 
the most important problems facing the American republic, the implications 
contained in that brief observation arc pertinent and pressing enough to war-
rant theoretical treatment. Twenty-first century America has produced a unique 
personality, one that is neither plebeian nor patrician. 1 nslead, we have citiicns 
who arc composites types: plebeian or commoner in taste and sentiment and pa-
trician or aristocratic in means and opportunity- "plebeicians/' if you will. 
These arc educated men and women of the middle class who take for granted 
that they have a right to pursue happiness but who do not have any clear idea or 
conception of what happiness is. In other words, they believe they can be al-
most anything they want to be, but they do not know anything they really 1110111 
to be. 
While making no claims that my sample is representative in a scientific or sta-
tistically valid manner, I draw the following insights from observation, conversa-
tion, and fifteen years of teaching political theory to undergraduates, who largely 
comprise the plebeician class, at both large state universities and smaller private 
religious institutions. In many instances, the problem manifests itself passively in 
the form of indifference masquerading as tolerance. As an old Calvin and I lob bes 
cartoon once proclaimed, "When you're cool the world bores you." In my teach-
ing, I have seen not only a vague and (strangely) reactionary allegiance to the no-
tion of tolerance, but often an inability or unwillingness to demonstrate any 
deeply-held beliefs that transcend the self. Whether it is from an inability to de-
fend one's attachments persuasively, from fear of ridicule for a lack of sophistica-
tion or from the larger fear of being labeled "judgmental" (and, hence, politically 
reprobate), students seem reluctant to engage in civil forms of public scrutiny, let 
120 
Liberalism and t he Challenge of Fight Club 
alone serious confrontations about values and meaning that might force them ei-
ther to take a stand or to re-evaluate their own beliefs and choices. However, in 
private conversations and in their journals, I hear and sense a longing for more. 
They do not want to spend their lives like Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych, who proclaimed 
near his death, " ls it really is sol I lost my life over that curtain as I might have 
clone when storming a fort. Ts that possible? How terrible and how stupid" (134). 
Yet they cannot seem to escape a social logic that perpetuates exactly this form of 
life. While there arc numerous sub-classes within American culture in general and 
youth-culture in particular for whom the above is something of a misnomer or 
even a red-herring, they remain susceptible to the same malaise that characterizes 
plebeician youth. 
Cultural theorist Anne Norton,s discussion of the relationship between 
American liberalism and shopping can be instructive here if we extrapolate the 
potential for psychological discontentment on the part of the reflective citizen 
who secs himself or herself in the following passage: 
The practice of shopping cnncts liberal theory's identification of choice with 
freedom nnd, in thnt ennctmcnt, suggests n critique. lndividunlity, the 
conventions governing property, nnd the utility of rcprcsentntion as an 
instrument of the nuthor's will nre nil cnllcd into question. We renlize, ns we 
shop, thnt choice mny be experienced ns freedom, nnd ns compulsion. The 
choices we nppcnr to mnke hnve nlrendy been mndc for us. The individuality 
we priic is rcnliicd in purchnses thnt deconstruct it. Property shows itself not 
only ns n menns for self-protection, sclf-ex'Pression, and self-discovery but 
nlso ns n mcnns for subjecting us to the nuthority of others. The enactment 
of the idem; of libernlism works simultaneously to confirm nnd subvert them 
(4) 
Despite the fact that the group I am speaking about may not be representative 
of the whole, 1 would argue that no country can afford to ignore this plebeician 
phenomenon because of the mischief this "class" might cause. Pew things are as 
pregnant with the potential for social and political disruption as a right or an en-
titlement in search of animation and reification. Such is the price for open-ended 
theorizations that grant opportunities to act without stipulating the objects or 
ends toward which the action ought to be directed. An historical context that still 
assumes that rights Qike the right to pursue happiness) arc "inalienable" or foun-
dational but has either rejected or forgotten the teleological imperative (the object 
of this pursuit) and, hence, has simultaneously embraced an anti-foundationalism, 
is one that is neither foundational nor anti-foundational. It is a context that is 
post-liberal but not post-modern. uch is the America of the Motorcycle Boy and 
his contemporary band of lost boys and girls. 
The first "liberals" were both foundationalists and heroic without being 
"ironists" 0lorty, Co11li11ge11cy xv). At great personal risk to themselves, they op-
posed the old authoritarian and hierarchical political regime in straightforward and 
practical language and with simple religious confidence in their political position. 
While not self-consciously liberal, the following passage from The Twelve Articles 
issued during the German peasant revolt in the mid-1520's sets the tone for the 
politics and theory that follows during the next two centuries: 
Article 3 
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It has been the custom hitherto for men to hold us as their own 
property which is pitiable enough considering that Christ has 
redeemed and purchased us without exception, by the shedding of 
I Iis precious blood, the lowly as well as the great. Accordingly, it is 
consistent with Scripture that we would be free and we wish to be so. 
Not that we want to be absolutely free and under no authority. God 
does not teach us that we should lead a disorderly life according to the 
lusts of the flesh, but that we should live by the commandments, love 
our God and our neighbor. (qtd. in Klosko 311-12) 
Along with this, they demanded certain rights and protections from the Lords, 
like the right to hunt, cut wood, and avoid overt exploitation (Klosko 311). In 
the most parsimonious voice of what would become traditional "liberalism," 
they asked for no political power without limits, liberty without license, and 
equality without leveling, and each of these claims was rooted in a biblical 
foundation and nurtured by an overtly Christian teleology, without which the 
sacrifices to come would have made little sense to the actors themselves.• The 
political result of the peasants' demands, of course, took the form of the Ger-
man nobility heeding Martin Luther's advice in his not so subtle tract Agoi11.!1 llJ1 
Robbing M11rderi11g Hordes of Peasa11/s. 
The Germans were not alone. Everywhere what would become liberal re-
forms appeared, war, slaughter, and repression quickly followed. Political liberal-
ism emerged from the womb of the modern world breached and bloody, 
surrounded by enemies, and demanding God-given rights and powers that would 
only be named " liberal" once its viability was assured. In some places, the enemies 
won, at least for a while. Elsewhere, as the adherents grew first in resolve and then 
in power, they remade the world by suffering, dying, and then returning the favor; 
they cut off the head of divine right, both figuratively and literally, not to melt all 
that was solid into air or to profane all that was holy, but to make the Word flesh. 
After 400 years, our theorists have managed to turn the flesh back into word. 
Taking our gains for granted, we have forgotten that " liberalism" was struggled 
for and lived through first, theorized later. While the latter was open to claims that 
it was social ly constructed and, hence, possibly variable, the former was assumed 
to have ontological validity. Indeed, the words and arguments that became a theo-
retical structure to house the liberal-self were contestable and no doubt imperfect 
representations of the reality they sought to signify, but the selves living within its 
walls were assumed to be "facts." Interpretable, yes, but superfluous never. Today, 
however, the structure itself is so battered that we have begun to doubt that any-
one could be living in it still. IIence the talk of the dccentcrcd subject that has 
been so much in vogue (foucault; Derrida). In what follows, I would like to bor-
row and adapt an argument made by Michael Walzer some years ago to sketch 
how I believe this phenomenon came to pass. 
In his book The Revo/11tio11 of the Sai11ls, Walzer sets out "a model of radica l 
politics" based on the experience of the English Puritans that he believes has gen-
eral implications for understanding later radical movements (317-320). The 
"story" of forgetting and overcoming (used here as a neutral descriptive term) 
that Walzer teUs at the close of his work is similar to the one I want to tell. For 
Walzer, it is the revolutionary Puritan saint who is forgotten and overcome by 
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something called a )jberal bourgeois. T n my story, it is the liberal bourgeois who 
becomes simply a bourgeois (my post-liberal "plebeician"). Walzer's model is laid 
out in the following manner (which I reproduce at some length but not in its en-
tirety): 
1. At a certain point ... there appears a band of "strangers" who view 
themselves as chosen men, saints and who seek a new order. ... 
2. These men arc marked off from their fellows by an extraordinary self-
assurance and daring. 
3. The band of the chosen confronts the existing world as if in war. 
4. The organization of the chosen suggests the nature of the new order they 
seek, but also reflects the necessities of the present struggle. 
5. The acting out of sainthood produces a new kind of politics. . . . 
c. The violent attack upon customary procedures sets the saints free to 
experiment politically. 
6. The historical role of the chosen band is twofold. Externally, as it were, the 
band of snints is n political movement aiming at social reconstruction .... 
D1sc1plinc 1s the cure for freedom and "unsettledness." 
Walzer then goes on to claim that 
One dny, however, that security becomes habit and zeal is no longer a worldly 
necessity. Then the ume of God's people is over. In this world, the last word 
always belongs to the worldings and not the saints .... They set the stage of 
history for the new order. Once that order is esmblished, ordinary men are 
cager enough to desert the warfare of the Lord for some more moderate 
pursuit of virtue. Once they feel sufficiently secure as gentlemen and 
merchants, as country justices and members of Parliament, they happily 
forego the further privilege of being "instruments." (319) 
While leaving the historical connection to religion intact, I would like to apply 
this model/argument in a more focused manner to the political aspects of the 
equation. It is my inference that the number of "warriors" fighting the old order 
as a whole greatly exceec.led the number of leaders who saw themselves as divine 
"instruments." These foot soldiers of modernity sought the protections, rights, 
and powers of what is called liberal citizenship. They were no less heroic, no less 
revolutionary, no less assured, no less disciplined, and no less interested in bring-
ing about a new political order. I Towever, they were more optimistic about human 
nature, more sanguine about the prospects for the emergent individualism, and, 
hence, less inclinec.l to repress their fellow travelers or their opponents into con-
formity beyond acceptance of a constitutional order and the rule of law. To para-
phrase Walzer: The triumph of Lockean ideas, on the other hand, suggests the 
overcoming of anxiety, the appearance of saints and citizens for whom sin is no 
longer a problem. The struggle against the old order seems largely to be won by 
Locke's time, and the excitement, confusion, and fearfulness of that struggle al-
most forgotten. Lockean liberals found it possible to dispense with religious, even 
with ideological, controls in human society and thought enthusiasm and battle-
readiness unattractive i11111e11. ln a sense, then, liberalism was dependent upon the 
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existence of "saints," that is, of persons whose good behavior could be relied 
upon. At the same time, the secular and genteel character of Hbcralism was deter-
mined by the fact that these were "saints" whose goodness (sociability, moral de-
cency, or mere respectability) was self-assured and relaxed, free from the 
nervousness and fanaticism of Calvinjst godliness (303). 
While liberalism was not nearly so complete elsewhere in 1700, it soon 
would be in various iterations throughout the West. In what would become the 
United States, liberalism was, in IIartz's phrase, "a kind of self-completing 
mechanism" (6), in other words, more or less innate (Boorstin Gmi11s and "Our 
Unspoken"). As such, even our revolution could be characterized as a "conser-
vative" event, especially when compared to the French Revolution (Arendt 011 
Revol11tio11). Although the rustorical/idcological theorizations of the American 
revolutionary period vary considerably,2 the bulk of the post-founding Ameri-
can citizenry can be aptly characterized as Wab~cr's "worldings" (Wood Radical-
ism). fi'or such people, citizenship is valuable for the protections and 
opportunities it affords them to pursue various public and private projects; it is 
mostly an instrumental good rather than the primary good or end in itself that it 
is often argued to be in republjcan political theory (Aristotle Politics; Arendt The 
H111na11 Co11ditio11). 
Ilowcvcr, rather than providing another lament about the decline of civic re-
sponsibility in the American liberal state (Barber; Elshtain), my purpose here is a 
little ruffcrcnt. I want to assert that even though American liberals in general 
viewed politics as instrumental, e.g. as preserving the right to pursue happiness, 
they did not view the ends pursued as bereft of teleological import. While they 
may have been early versions of what we now call "value pluralists"J regarding the 
power of the state to impose various kinds of social, political, or religious ortho-
doxjcs on its citizenry, they did not necessarily believe that one opinion or way of 
life was as good as the next. You can be (or perhaps co11/d be) a "value pluralist" 
politically without embracing relativism personally (Galston "Value" 770). lndccd, 
early liberalism's close intellectual tics to the Enlightenment explicitly rule out 
such relativism even while taking a hard stand in the name of tolerance (Locke). 
Liberals like Locke, Jefferson, and Mill bcHeved that the "truth" was out there and 
that the "free market place of ideas" was the best hope for discovering it. What 
makes them "liberals" rather than "conservatives" is not their rejection of truth as 
an ideal, but rather their unwillingness to impose it on others and repress those 
with whom they disagree. As Mill himself put it, "We can never be sure that the 
opinion we arc endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion" (18). J f owevcr, this brand 
of liberal humility should not be confused with an intellectual indifference that 
refuses to engage in critical judgment. As Mi ll explains later: 
We have a right, also, in various ways, to acl upon our unfavorable opinion of 
anyone, not to the oppression of his indjvidualil-y, bul in Lhe exercise of ours. 
We arc not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it 
(th~ugh not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the 
society most acceptable to us. lire ha11e a right, a11d ii 111ay be our dury, to caution 
olherJ O$f1i11JI him, if 111e thiflk hiJ example or co11verJalio11 like!J lo ha1ie a pemicio111 
e.fftct OfJ thoJe 1vith 111hom he aJsociales. (72, emphasis mine) 
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But Mill docs not stop with his assertion of the reciprocal nature of the rights 
of individuals; he goes on to paint a general picture of the sorts of individuals 
who might be pernicious and deserving of our avoidance: a person who shows 
rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit, who cannot live within moderate means, who 
cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences-who pursues animal plea-
sures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect-must expect to be low-
ered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favorable 
sentiments (72-73). By inverting Mill's picture above, I believe we can recast rus 
negative injunction concerning what to avoid as a positive proclamation about 
what to embrace. In other words, if we want to be the sort of person who does 
not wish to have others warned against seeking our society, we should not be 
rash, obstinate, conceited, immoderate, unrestrained, overly indulgent, animalis-
tic, unfeeling, or anti-intellectual but rather the opposites of these things. For 
lack of a better term, such a person would have what we could call a liberal 
character and disposition. But, if the opinions of others did not matter, why 
should such a character be preferred to an aliberal or even illiberal one? 
Mill hm; an answer for this question as well, namely the lack of such a char-
acter deme>nstrates "want of personal dignity and self-respect" (73). Since rus 
larger concern in this chapter of 011 Uberty is the relationship between the soci-
ety and the individual, Mill docs not say much else with regard to inruvidual 
psychology. The implication, however, strikes me as plain: those inruviduals 
who deny their own dignity by embracing some form of ilUberal life arc some-
how deformed as human beings as a result. While for Mill that deformity is not 
the business of society insofar as it docs no harm to others, he docs leave room 
open for intervention on the part of friends. In his words, "the worst we shall 
think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if 111e do 1101 i11terftre 
be11evolmt/y by sho111i11g i11lerest or co11cem for bi11I' (74). Such a friendly intervention, 
one must assume, would need to include the following stages: demonstrating 
and persuading the individual in question of the nature of the deformity, show-
ing him or her the path to rectifying it, and finally explaining the utility of the 
change to the individual. The first two strike me as simply logical and obvious 
but the last is a little trickier and requires a return to the earlier line of argu-
ment about the historical development of liberalism itself. 
While Wal~cr's model above docs a good job of explaining ho111 liberalism 
came to be, neither he nor 1 have answered the question of 111/!J it came to be. The 
German peasants outlined the moral authority for their request to be free, but we 
were never told why they wished to be free in the first place. Such is the power of 
the term "freedom" in our contemporary lexicon-we assume that the answer to 
the question is "self-evident." But, of course, it is not necessarily the case. There is 
any number of reasons why someone would like to be free and not all of them are 
good ones; there arc also good reasons for rejecting freedom in favor of other val-
ues (1 Tobbcs). What 1 want to suggest is that there arc specifically liberal reasons 
for wanting to be free and that those reasons, in a general sense, represent the te-
leological thrust of liberalism. Jn place of Richard Rorty's negative description of 
a " liberal" as someone who thinks "that cruelty is the worst thing we can do" 
(Co11li11ge11ry xv), 1 would like to argue that we substitute a positive definition based 
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on Thoreau's sentiments in l'Paldm. In other words, a " liberal,, is some who 
wants to "live deliberatively ... and not, when !they] come to die, discover that 
[they] had not lived,,, who docs not wish to practice "resignation,,, and who 
wants to "live deep and suck out all the marrow of life,, (47-48). While this 
may seem like a redefinition, it is in my mind a rededication. It is necessary be-
cause so many of us have forgotten and hence transformed liberalism into some-
thing very different without having engaged in a deliberative process as such. At 
the most basic level, this is worth talking about because I believe the initial 
goals of liberal theory and practice were justifiable and, in a sense, "true.» 
To live "deliberately,,, however, requires that individuals arc not "de-
formed,, either by their own poor choices or by society's repressive mechanisms. 
The first "liberals,, (Walzcr's saints and, later, their liberal bourgeois progeny) 
understood this and embarked simultaneously (though in varying degrees) on in-
dividual-friendly political projects a11d very demanding, rigorous projects of the 
self. While the second projects took many forms, what linked them together 
was the imperative of choo.ri11g and the quest for proficiency and excellence. The 
goal of the modern liberal world was the same as that of the classical world of 
Aristotle, namely happiness (Aristotle, Ethics Bk. I). The price for happiness wns 
diligence and excellence in the things chosen. The important point of departure 
for liberalism from the classical world, from the medieval Christian world, and 
even from modern republican ideology, was the staunch belief that the good it-
self could be multiple and varied even if the injunction to pursue it vigorously 
was uniform. Instead of building a "city on a hill,,, we would build selvu 011 the 
hill for everyone else to sec and maybe emulate. 
In this way, the right to pursue happiness can be said to have implied a recipro-
cal d11ty to pursue happiness. The liberal needs to be politically free to be happy, 
and so the state must not arbitrarily prevent the pursuit of individual excellence. 
But, the liberal must be "undeformed,, personally and socially as well and, hence, 
demand the sort of discipline from one's self that in other eras was supplied by 
the state, Church, or other authoritarian institutions (uscc.I here in a non-pejorative 
manner). When individuals fail to discipline themselves, the liberal a la Mill, must 
resist stepping in with the state to "force them to be free,,, and, instead, pity them. 
Friends, however, can demonstrate (and may even have a duty to demonstrate) 
concern and intervene benevolently-though not in an authoritarian manner- to 
help an individual sec and want to heal the deformity. Friends do this because they 
want those they care about to be capable of happiness; they <lo not have to avoid 
their friends or warn others to do so.4 1t is my argument that, like Walzer's liberal 
bourgeois who "forgot,, that he or she stood on space created by the Puritan 
saint, the contemporary bourgeois has "forgotten,, that he or she stands on the 
space created by the liberal insofar as the contemporary bourgeois accepts the 
right to pursue happiness as foundational in origin but ignores the duty to do so. 
They do this under the mistaken assumption that whatever is chosen is, by virtue 
of having been chosen, good and in no need of any defense beyond what is mini-
mally acceptable to the actor. While preventing the state from stepping in and en-
forcing such a duty, no early liberal like Locke, Mill, or Jefferson would have 
accepted this position as legitimate (If olmcs). 
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As liberals of one sort or another, most authentic, founding American 
thinkers would have rejected such a position as well by casting aspersion on 
such people, pitying them, or intervening as "friends.,, Unfortunately, such 
thinkers arc becoming less visible and audible, and an important tradition in 
American political theory is being lost. In turn, a liberalism worthy of the name 
is disappearing as the processes of "bourgeoisification»s and 
"postmodcrnization,, continues in the wake of our own forgetfulness. It is to 
this disappearing tradition that we must turn if we are to recover American lib-
eralism in its fullest and most defensible form and rescue American political 
thought from what I will call the challenge of Fight C/11b in the final section of 
this essay. 
America's Sermonic Tradition and Our True Lost Soul 
While rejecting much of the ocratic metaphysic concerning the good life, 
American liberalism still held fast to the notion of a good life. Though the pos-
sible "lives" that might be considered "good,, were plural in liberal America, the 
need to defend one's choices and strategics (ends and means) was constant. Resi-
dues of liberalism persist today. While often asked harmlessly enough, the ques-
tion "What c.lo you want to be when you grow up?,, is culturally loaded. Contrary 
to most traditional societies, the question carries with it the pregnant possibility 
embedded in the core of liberal ideology; we can, quite literally in many cases, 
choose what we want to be. I fowcvcr, once answered, the question most certainly 
begs the next: "Why?" still beyond the second question, there is often a third stage 
to the conversation that involves the various demands and risks involved in the 
given choice and perhaps even a discussion of alternatives that might be more ap-
propriate for a given person. J ~vcn though the state is denied much of a role in an 
individual's decision, others arc not. I low one is to live and what one is to do for a 
living arc considered choices open for public, though not political, scrutiny. Fail-
ure to answer the questions or an inability to defend the choices properly is con-
sidered a sign of immaturity or confusion not befitting a full person or competent 
individual. This process also persists today in college admissions, especially to elite 
schools and programs. While we arc properly denied the use of things like race, 
gender, religious affiliation, national origin, and so on in making admissions deci-
sions, we arc allowed to use "personal statements,, and interviews to make our se-
lections. The basic goal of the personal statement is to convince the readers that 
the student has given a good deal of thought as to the kind of life he or she thinks 
valuable and that he or she is sufficiently able and committed to achieving it. 
These arc just two instances of what I would call" ocratic instances,, in American 
life. 
A "Socratic instance,, is one where the participants in some brand of "conver-
sation,, take for granted the proposition that " the unexamined life is not worth 
living" (or at least not worthy of respect). uch an instance, (i.e., when a person 
feels compelled to give a persuasive answer to the question, ccwhat do you want to 
be when you grow up?,,), when shared between at least two parties,6 produces a 
public spectacle that elicits judgment on the part of the observers and participants 
regarding the choices and reasons offered up. The hope of such a process, when 
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done in good fajth, is that the partners to the conversation will be improved 
(i.e., rendered less "deformed"). Looking at the Apology, we sec Socrates pro-
claiming, in what would become a Millian spirit, that his practice of philosophy 
renders him a friend to the city (29d; Arendt "Philosophy and Politics"). 11 is 
preparedness to question any and all citizens whether rich or poor, cstablishcc.I 
or marginal, and so on, in order to sec if the citizen "attaches little importance 
to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things" (30a), is 
a benevolent attempt to help individuals choose their lives and actions in ways 
that will increase their happiness. As Socrates cxplajns a little later, he secs his 
role as conferring on a subjects the "greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him 
not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as 
good and as wise as possible" (36d). Comparing himself to the well-treated and 
publicly-rewarded "Olympian victor," Socrates asserts that "the Olympian vic-
tor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy" (38c). 
This distinction between thinking one's self happy and actually being happy 
is not one that fine.ls a hospitable home in the ccmtcmpe>rary American liberal 
mind. Americans tend to be either content or c.lisce>ntcnt, but sclc.lom can we 
commit to the seeming absurdity of being discontent with what makes us con-
tent or content with what makes us discontent. Yet, this is exactly the sort of 
stance that a richer Socratically-inspircd liberalism demands of us; this is the 
sort of life called forth by a wisdom that "knows that it docs not know." Meta-
phorically, it is like a hummingbird at a feeder. From a distance the bird appears 
still, but in reality, the wings arc moving at a tremendous rate to maintain the 
stillness. If the Socratic/liberal mind is working optimally, the standing still 
(contentment) is only achieved legitimately (being happy) by rapid, sustained 
wing movement (discontentment comparable to self examination through 
shared questions). In other words, the bird must move to stand sti ll to achieve 
its goal of eating from the feeder (happiness). To relinquish either part is to 
" think oneself wise when one is not" or to "think yourself happy." This is ah10 
how we can make sense of Aristotle's assertion that you cannot juc.lgc a man 
happy until the end of his life. Unfortunately, contemporary Americans arc not 
readily given to deferring gratification. This is what I will suggest leads to the 
"misery of happiness." 
Contemporary bourgeois citizens arc plagued by the " misery of happiness" 
because they think themselves happy rather than being happy. This is because they 
and their political culture have displaced what I will call authentic individualism 
with "deviant" forms like expressive or possessive individualism (Macpherson). 
The crude distinction between the two involves the former asserting that the 
unexamined life is not worth living and the deviant forms, by whatever name, 
making no such value claim.7 Thus, in deviant forms of liberalism, the 
unexamined life is given moral and political equivalence to the examined life. 
What I have called traditional liberalism would have nothing to do with such an 
assertion, and the demands of "friendship" require that liberal thinkers do not let 
the unexamined self go unchallenged. Before I continue, however, J want to be 
clear that it is not my objective here to assert the existence of some core self or 
"real" person who is engaging in some brand of false-consciousness and who is in 
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need of "wising up." On the contrary, I am not making any ontological claims; 
instead, T am suggesting that within the liberal tradition right!J 11nderstood there is 
a particular kine.I of individualism and happiness that historically corresponded 
to the aims of political liberation, that the political constructions that followed 
the initial formation of the tradition arc consistent with those aims, and that 
these aims have been neglected or forgotten at the price of accomplishing the 
original ends. I Jenee, if the original ends are stil l valued, then it behooves us to 
recover the traditional meanings of individualism and happiness, such that they 
might be lived agrun by those to whom the original aims appeal. Far then from 
what might be thought of as metaphysics, my project is ultimately concerned 
with how we live instead of what we are. 
l'or purposes of this argument, I rely heavily on the ideal of "authenticity" 
as articulated by Charles Taylor. Referring to the work of Rousseau and later 
I Ierdcr, Taylor suggests that the contemporary ideal of authenticity, that in its 
most "degraded, absurd, or trivialized" form provides justification for "doing 
your own thing," rests o n a "powerful moral ideal that has come down to us" 
(29). That ic.Jeal held that "there is a ccrtrun way of being human that is my way. 
I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone 
else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I 
miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me" (28-29). E mbed-
ded in such a view, of course, is the potential for the sort of social atomism and 
solipsism that serves as the basis for numerous critiques of liberalism.8 Yet, the 
force of the ideal remains constant and, however battered, continues to serve as 
the foundation for the constitutional protections that Americans take for 
granted. 
Where Taylor's argument joins the one I have been sketching, and moves us 
beyond the more simplistic or heavy handed debates between liberalism and its 
critics, is through his assertion of the " fundamentally dialogical character" of hu-
man life (33). Taylor calls this "dialogical charactee' of human life an " inescapable 
horizon" (part of human facticity): 
We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and 
hence of defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human 
languages of expression .... No one acquires the languages needed for self-
definition on their own. We arc introduced to them through exchanges with 
others who mauer to us .. .. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense 
nol "monological," not something each accomplishes on his or her own, but 
dialogical. (33) 
r Icnce, who I am and who you arc arc not separate questions if we arc familiar 
with each other's lives, words, and expressive acts. We arc part of each other to the 
extent that we carry on some sort of "conversation" that can challenge, change, or 
reinforce our particular perceptions, beliefs, and choices. As "friends" (broadly 
construed) we arc each other's Socratic interlocutor or Millian benevolent inter-
vener; we arc each other's necessary source of " discontent" that makes liberal 
happiness (contentment) possible. Moreover, this relationship is not bounded by 
time or space insofar as our "conversations," while possibly constant in some 
form, need not be immcc.liatc or concurrent with one another. Taylor explains: 
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Moreover, this is not just a fact about genesis, which can be ignored later 
on. It's not just that we learn the languages in dialogue and then go on 
to use them for our own purposes on our own. This describes our 
situation to some extent in our culture. We arc expected to develop 
our own opinions, outlook, stances to things, to a considerable degree 
through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with 
important issues, such as the definition of our identity. We define this 
always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities 
our significant others want to recognize in us. And even when we 
outgrow some of the latter-our parents for instancc--and they 
disappear from our Lives, the conversation with them continues within us as 
long as we live. (33) 
I would only add to Taylor's account by claiming that, aside from particular 
others, we arc aJso in "conversation" with books, various forms of art, historical 
ideas, and exemplary figures that we believe arc significant and that produce in us 
a visceral need to respond. Those "texts" with which we construct and recon-
struct our identities arc the root of authentic 0ibcral) individualism. lt is n process 
that involves constant and conscious tinkering, like the movement of the 
hummingbird's wings. Inauthentic "individualism" comes from at least two gen-
eral directions: the "right," where conservative or more authority-minded thinken; 
attempt to project a monologicaJ identity upon a person without giving the person 
a chance to respond or otherwise participate in the conversation; and the "lcft,0 
where the need for other voices is dismissed as irrelevant and often labeled au-
thoritarian and illiberal. Oddly enough, however, both modes arc repressive from 
the stance of authentic individualism. In turn, even when we accept the argu-
ments of the right or the left willingly, we arc like Socrates' citizens who ench have 
their own "Olympian victor'' who makes them "think themselves happy." Taylor 
explains, "To shut out the demands emanating beyond the self is precisely to sup-
press the conditions of significance, and hence to court trivialfaation" (40). The 
larger of the two problems in American political culture today, however, is the 
former not the latter. Indeed, the " left" (those who dismiss other voices as irrel-
evant) has won this battle (unfortunately it may have come ironically at the price 
of the war), insofar as even my most "conservative" students still believe that be-
ing called "judgmental" is a bad thing and that we should do "whatever makes us 
ha.ppy and n~t worry ab~ut w~at other people think." (Unless, of course, they 
think you arc JUdgmcntaJ, m which case you should worry what they think.) Under 
the guise of tolerance, this flat and tepid individualism is, more often than not 
just a thinly-masked excuse for a robust indifference and casuaJ conformity. l ~ 
other words, it is a relationship of convenience that, despite its pretense of nobil-
ity and homage, is rcalJy just a front for sclf-ccntcrcdncss and an excuse for intel-
lectual and moraJ sloth. WhiJe there arc clements in such an assertion that dovetail 
with similar neo-conscrvative critiques like those associated with Allan Bloom it 
is more a reflection of how far we have moved from the initial liberal ideal tha~ a 
reactionary or pre-modern lament. As Donald Lutz would remind us, good theory 
has a transccndcn t character that political ideology typica lly docs not (1 O). Jn 
othc.r wor~s, go~d. theory might work for thinkers of very different political per-
suasions, like political dcccntraliiation in the hands of John Calhoun, Students for 
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a Democratic ocicty, and the Black Panthers. This, of course, is not to say that 
there arc not genuine and thoughtful liberals who believe that their approach and 
work represent important and much needed additions, reforms, or clarifications to 
a healthy and living liberalism. This essay, however, is directed at the political 
thinkers and theorists who arc somehow complicit either directly or indirectly in 
the drastic dilution of the liberal tradition by what they are 1101 doing. To them, I 
would like to extend a challenge to reclaim lost ground for the sake of liberalism 
itself. 
Among the more prominent thinkers I am talking about is someone like Ri-
chard Rorty, who has spoken about both liberaJ theory and liberal practice. He 
and many others have been successful in persuading their fellow citizens of at 
least the public utility of treating their commitments as "contingent," insofar as 
arguments from authority or first principles arc not considered socially persua-
sive or definitive. While for many this plays out in an increase in toleration for 
difference and a renewed respect for diversity, it has also had the unintended 
consequence of allowing those uninterested in such things to hold their authori-
tnrian beliefs with more security and with less need of sustained or rigorous de-
fense. If the left is freed from accountability to public reason, so too is the 
right.9 Jn turn, the progressive political agenda that Rorty in particular has 
linked himself to in his recent book Achieving 011r Co1111try, an agenda that re-
quires a high level of commitment and sacrifice, is, in all likelihood, going to 
fa ll on deaf cars because he gives no better reason for thinking like he does po-
litically than that he thinks that way. Sadly, for all his philosophical power, 
Rorty's most enduring contribution to the public reaJm will probably be an in-
crease in indifference and perhaps even seriously decreased levels of tolerance. 
O n the other hand, there arc other contemporary thinkers who understand 
this problem quite well. Will Kymlicka begins with what I would term a self-evi-
dent, though often overlooked, truth as it relates to the liberaJ world: 
Our essential interest is in leading a good life, in having those things that a 
good life conlains. That may seem to be a pretty banal claim. But it has 
important consequences. For leading a good life is different from leading the 
life we mrrenl/y belietie to be good-that is, we recognize that we may be 
mistaken about the worth or value of what we arc currently doing. We may 
come to sec that we have been wasting our lives, pursuing trivial or shallow 
goals and projecls that we had mistakenly considered of great importance. 
(10) 
William Galston echoes this idea by asking us to consider two ideal types, ''Lib-
eral" and "Traditional." T n his words: 
Liberal lives her life in full awareness of the truth value of pluralism. She 
knows that her way of li fe, although a source of meaning and satisfaction, is 
but one among many defensible lives she might have led under different 
circumstances .... By contrast, to the extent that he is even aware of ways of 
life other than his own, Traditional regards them as in ferior or even 
contemp tible. I le docs not sec his own way of li fe as a choice, and because 
he believes there is only one right way to live, he sees no particular value in 
the fact of individuals' identification with ways of li fe other than his own. If 
value plumlism has objective validity, the Libeml knows something that 
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Traditional does not (773) 
Among the things that Liberal must consider that Traditional either need not or 
~ann·o·t is.that her way of life might be wrong. If she "forgets" this by preventing 
mqu1ncs mto her reasons for the choice she has made, the distinction between the 
two types disappears and even Libcral's liberalism becomes "traditional." 
Liberal states and liberal citizens arc precluded from forcing us into living a 
different kind of life even if they think we arc mistaken. Indeed, they arc pre-
cluded from using force of any kind, even if we ourselves claim we arc mistaken. 
~h~n.ge, if it is to come, must be the product of a free choice on the part of the 
mdiv1dual or else the change is illiberal. I Iowcver, this docs not mean that ex-
ternal entities are not allowed to influence the choices of an inc.livic.lual as an 
extension of their own liberty. In fact, friends, and perhaps others as well, may 
even have a duty to provide such input out of either self-interest or benevolent 
conc~rn. In America, however, liberal practice and some liberal thought has pro-
gressively fallen deeper into an illogical trap best symbolized by what we as a 
culture have decided is 1101 to be discussed in polite company (or at the dinner 
table for that mattcr)-namcly, politics and religion (Neuhaus). For 1mmc, this 
silence is the product of a strategy of conflict avoidance, but for others, it is 
the product of a mistaken understanding of what l have called liberalism's te-
leological imperative. As argued above, for our individualism to be robust, 
meaningful, and authentic, it must be dialogical; this idea is supportec.l still fur-
ther by the fact that our current beliefs about the good life can be mistaken 
(and, hence, in need of reform). As such, not only arc we o/101116d to talk about 
these things in a critical manner with others, sci f-intcrest and/ or friendship de-
mands that we do. Some liberal theorists and thoughtful liberal citizens have 
mistakenly assumed that the requirement of some form of neutrality (here to be 
read as simply non-suppression) on the part of a liberal state requires the same 
neutrality on their part. However, what liberalism precludes the state from c.lo-
ing is not meant to be precluded altogether, but rather such power is appropri-
ately ~~nsfcrred to the citb~cnry itself, including, of course, political theorists 
a~~ cnacs. 1~ ~ f both the state and the citizenry arc precluded from engaging in-
d1v1duals cnacally, then we must ask, "Who is left?" The answer is obviously , , 
no one. The result of this is to create a monological vacuum in which (to steal a 
phrase from Tocqueville) each of us is shut up in the soUtude of his or her own 
heart and, hence, rendered incapable of the authentic individualism that liberal-
ism was meant to fa.cilitate in th~ first place. In turn, when viewed through the 
l~ns ~f hu.~an .hap~~ncss, t~crc is no longer a good answer to the question 1111!] 
lzberalrsm? I he inability to give a good answer to that question is effectively to 
have lost the soul of liberalism. 
Americans used to know this. From the Church pulpit to the political plat-
form, and in many places in between, Americans confronted each other as citizcn-
fricnds and. ar~~u~atcd . in conversation an answer to the root question, "r row 
ought I to _live? Even if we grant the premise of Rorty and his fellow-travelers 
that there is no foundational or " final vocabulary" that can be referenced in an-
swer to the "why" question, it docs not mean we must accept his assertion that 
"the vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argu-
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mcnt" (Co11ti11ge11cy xiv). Indeed, the very lack of such a vocabulary points to-
ward the Emcrsonian dictum that "frequent self-examination is the duty of all" 
(qtd. in Abbott 14). The lack of our ability to definitively settle the question 
docs not logically imply that the question itself and our repeated, varied at-
tempts to answer it a rc without value; as Camus cautions us at the close of his 
short story, "We must imagine Sisyphus happy." 
When all is said and done, Rorty's faux-Cartesianism that points toward some-
thing like I am therefore I ofll, makes the distinction between the examined life and 
the unexamined life all but irrelevant roll the rock up the hill, don't roll the rock 
up the hill, it's all the same. Yet, however true this might be from the outside-
in-perspcctive of the philosopher, it is not the same from the inside-out-per-
spective of the searching individual. The argument thus far has been that 
happiness depends on the dialogic search itself. Liberalism, rightly understood, 
requires that same perpetual question and struggling on the part of its adher-
ents. To help in the partial recovery of the "soul" of liberalism, I suggest that 
we look to what one theorist has termed the "sermonic tradition" in American 
political thought as an example of the deeper sort of liberal tradition being de-
scribed in this essay, liberalism with a purpose. Jn his States of Perftct Freedom, 
Philip Abbott argues that the "scrmonic tradition" that links the work of 
American political actors and thinkers as diverse as Benjamin l'ranklin and 
Malcolm X represents a "common form of political thinking in America" that 
should be viewed not as "defective or truncated political thought'' but as "one 
that originates from America's unique historical position" (10-11). Abbott ar-
gues that the essential fcnturcs of the scrmonic tradition can be summed up in 
the following manner: 
First, it repeatedly asks the same type question: " I low cn.n I be saved/ 
successful/ virtuous/ rich/healthy /happy?" Emerson once remarked that 
each person was confronted with a very practical question: "l low ought I to 
live?" That a question such as this should be regarded as practical reveals a 
central aspect of American political thought. The sermonic tradition suffers 
less from an inability to grasp political categories than from a belief that this 
"practical" question is a logically (and morally) prior one. Thus the question 
" I low ought I to live?" involves n conscious attempt to politicize personal life 
and indirectly (and often unwittingly) challenges the libero! distinction 
between state and society and public and private .... But most of all, the 
scrmonic tradition ... assumes that each individual is responsible for the 
rightness and wrongness of an issue, that he or she must make a decision on 
the issue in question, that upon making that decision must act on it at once, 
that while such aclion has national, even worldwide import, above all it has 
personal significance. Those who do not accept such a change of heart arc 
regarded with suspicion and often open hostility. (11-12) 
Where Plato suggested in the Rep11blic that we look to the larger city in order to sec 
the individual soul, Abbott secs the American strategy as the inverse: we look to 
the smaller individual in order to understand the city. With its emphasis on con-
sent and the social contract, such a view seems perfectly appropriate in the context 
of liberal political theory. When we look to those individuals, however, we should 
not sec static, unchanging selves, but rather individuals searching and offering 
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themselves up as examples, as living, breathing counter-intuitivcs for other indi-
viduals. Viewing autobiography as "sermonic assertion," Abbott argues that it and 
the larger tradition it represents in American culture "not only tells us about the 
process of individual political commitment but it also reveals a great deal about 
the formation of the self in liberal society,, (13). 
Extrapolating from this particular representation of the tradition, it is my 
contention that "sermonic assertion" aimed at producing periodic changes of 
heart is at the root of a properly understood "dialogical" liberalism. J Jenee, the 
onus would seem to be on those who want to argue from within the tradition that 
the unexamined life is worth living, and that it is just as valuable and theoretically 
coherent as the examined life. Yet, there has been little in the way of a sus-
tained defense of this position, and it is my argument that from within the lib-
eral tradition no such defense can effectively be made. I would assert that while 
coercion regarding the good life is not allowed, mutual "proselytizing" is not 
only desirable, but necessary and perhaps even required. Oddly enough though, 
much current public thinking and practice rejects public proselytizing as impo-
lite at best and anti-liberal at worst. The "sermonic tradition" and the dialogic, 
contentious, and liberal tradition it represents, has all but been vanquished from 
the contemporary American public square in favor of a significantly thinner, 
more insular and bourgeoisified individualism. (1 t seems that today we must 
now be kept safe from the opinions and questions of others as well as their ac-
tions.) Below, I will sketch some partial evidence of this phenomenon and dis-
cuss what I sec as the current and long range political and cultural problems of 
this transformation as a rationale for recovering and embracing the demands of 
an earlier "thicker" American liberatism. 
The Challenge of Fight Club 
There is any number of fiJms, books, or other cultural representations that 
co~ld serve ~s a conduit for my purposes here. The film A1mrica11 Bea11ty comes 
quickly to mind. Indeed, there is a whole genre of films that I would call A111erica11 
angst movies, movies that caJI the thinness of bourgeois life into question to vari-
ous ends. Yet, a good many of them ultimately rcify some version of that which 
they seek to criticize by choosing something like bourgeois love over bourgeois 
career, and so on. In American Bea11ty, for example, Kevin Spacey's trek back in to 
th~ counter-~ulture lifestyle that his suburban existence had all but vanquishc<l is 
ult:unately rejected. In place of his idealized bohemianism, we arc asked by the 
now dead protagonist to sec beauty everywhere, even in the " dance" of a dis-
carded plastic bag. 
This is where Fight C/11b departs from its species and itself attempts to 
"evolve." Fight C/11b winces at the end, but it docs not flinch. On the other hand 
the .wince i~sel f is aJJ. too telling and representative of America's problems.'' Th~ 
basic s t~ry .~s ra~her simple. The narrator "Jack" (played by Edward Norton) is, as 
he puts it, a thtrty year old boy" who has become a "slave to the IKEA nesting 
instinct" an~ asks questions li~e "what sort of dining set defines me as a person?" 
As he explains after an explosion wipes out his apartment, "When you buy furni-
ture you tell yourself, 'O.k. that's the last sofa I'm gonna need. Whatever else hap-
pens I've got that sofa thing covered.' I had it all. I had a stereo that was very 
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decent, a wardrobe that was getting very respectable. I was close to being com-
plete." Jack, a recall administrator, paints a rather disturbing picture of a corporate 
America, where the decision by a car company to recall a particular line of cars is 
the product of a simple mathematical equation that works like this: take the num-
ber of cars of that make on the road (A), the rate of failure (B), the average cost 
of an out-of-court settlement (C), multiply them together and compare to the 
cost of a recall (X). Tf Ax Bx C< X, then there is no recall no matter how many 
deaths and injuries may result. Instead of using this information in any 
Silkwoodesque manner, however, Jack uses it to leverage his employer into paying 
him not to work or come to the office. 
Plagued not by his conscience but by the extreme banality of his bourgeois 
existence, Jack creates a swaggering alter ego named Tyler Durden (played by Brad 
Pitt). Together, he and Tyler create a phenomenon called "Fight Club," where men 
get together in dank basements and beat each other bloody. The fights are as bru-
tal as Jack's daytime incarnation is banal, but no one dies and at the close of the 
fights there is a cathartic embrace and praise heaped on the founders for creating 
this opportunity to feel alive. In Jack's words, "Fight Club wasn't about winning or 
losing; it wasn't about words. The hysterical shouting was in tongues-like a Pen-
tecostal church. When the fighting was over nothing was solved, but we all felt 
saved." Fight Club is both the antithesis and ultimate expression of the contem-
porary support groups that the movie openly mocks. As the phenomenon spreads 
and new fight clubs begin springing up al l over the country, the movie turns hap-
hazardly towards the political. The fight dubbers arc slowly molded into a prank-
ster army of corporate saboteurs who don the black fatigues and boots and 
haircuts of a neo-fascist movement and worship Tyler Durden while renouncing 
their own identities to better serve the cause. T hat cause is the destruction of cor-
porate (bourgeois) America in the form of blowing up credit card companies to 
create the "collapse of financial history" that will move us "one step closer to eco-
nomic equilibrium.'' While the violence early in the film and crude politics of the 
movie's end led many critics to denounce the film as an apology for fascism, no 
one other than the most piously anti-ironic viewer could really take the visible 
"politics" of the movie's end seriously. One need only ponder for a moment the 
fact that the o nly member of the fight club "army" that was known by name was 
Robert Paulson (played by Meat LoaQ. Paulson was a 300+ pound man with ex-
tremely large breasts and no testicles. While his character is certainly the represen-
tative of the movie's social emasculation sub-text, he is no one's poster-boy for the 
master-race. Even the would-be "Hitler" in the bunker, Jack, is a screw-up; his at-
tempt to kill himself by placing a gun in his mouth and pulling the trigger results 
in blowing out the side of his face. l le is left disfigured and bloody but not badly 
injured and, as the financial district explodes around them, he reassures the love 
interest, Marla, that " Everything is going to be fine .... You met me at a very 
strange time in my life." (l'his is the " wince.") 
f'or all its raw power and emo tion, Fight Club ends in a wink when the viewer 
had expected at least some sort of vision. While it doesn't let us off the hook 
completely, it docs lack the nerve, will, self-confidence, or perhaps, in the mind of 
the writer, the right to point out a direction of its own. While telling us that we are 
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"not unique snowflakes," we "are not the car [wcl drive, the contents of [our] 
wallets, [and] not our khakis" and that "it's only after we've lost everything that 
we arc free to do anything" it never stoops to give us a real hint about what we 
arc or what we should be. It is a screeching jeremiad without the "good news." 
It is bereft of "scrmonk assertion." Many will, of course, say quickly that that 
is precisely the point-to strip away the seductive and protective sheathing of 
the contemporary world and expose its raw acidic reality to a complacent and 
desensitized audience-public. Many may even be quick to say that the movie is 
playing the Socratic role I praised earlier. But, this is wrong. ocrates' question-
ing was designed to show individuals where they had perhaps reasoned incor-
rectly. Where Socrates ostensibly took neither a position nor a side, Fight C/11b 
has taken a side but not a position. We know what Jack (and Fight C/11b) is 
against, but we do not know what he is for. As such, he is both a product of 
contemporary libcralism,s failure and a co-conspirator in its continued demise. 
Almost as if conscious of this he exclaims in a third-person reference to him-
self, "This is Jack,s wasted life." 
After pummeling the audience and, literally, himself; after calling on us to 
"consider the possibility that God docs not like you, that he never wanted you, 
that in all probability he hates you;" and after rallying us to "fuck ambition" and 
"fuck redemption" and accept our fate as "Goc.l,s unwanted children," he leaves us 
on our own and without example. Because, even though "you weren't alive any-
where like you were at fight club," there is no sense that Jack was happy in the 
fight club. And while certainly living counter-culturally in the extreme, he was still 
not living deliberately in Thorcau>s sense of the term. 
The film's passionate diagnosis of the problem of bourgcoisification reso-
nates, I believe, with many younger and early middle-agec..1 Americans (especially 
men). Tyler exclaims to his fellow-travelers: 
An entire generation wasted. Slaves with while collars. Advertising has us 
cherishing cars and cloths, working jobs we hale so that we c:rn buy shit we 
don't need. We arc the middle children of history. No purpose or place. We 
have no great war, no Great Depression. Our great war is a spiritual war; our 
great Depression is our lives. We've all been raised on television to believe 
that one day we would all be millionaires, movie-gods, and rock-stars. But, we 
won't. We are slowly learning that fact and we arc pissed off. 
While the bluntness of this speech anc..I others like it tends towards the dic..lactic, it 
is ultimately an impotent didacticism. In academic language, Anne Norton>s allu-
sion to a similar problem captures the sorrow but not the rage of the Durc..lcn 
character, "The individuality we pri%c is rcali%ed in purchases that dcconstruct it" 
(4). One step forward, one step back; the game is rigged. We arc consumers for 
whom consumption has become an encl rather than a means because the act itself 
"dcconstructs" the goal of the initial act. This elusiveness is a formula for unhap-
pmess. 
As I said at the outset, there arc bigger problems in the world. Much of the 
world would be hard pressed to feel sympathy for this plight. But, like it or not, 
these "middle children of history," our "motorcycle boys and girls," represent an 
important problem for liberalism and American society and a challenge to Ameri-
can political thinkers and theorists. I t is a problem going unadclrcssecl and a chat-
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lenge going mostly unmet. fi'irst and foremost, in terms of reasons for that ne-
glect, is the fact that the situation has developed incrementally and, for the 
most part, unconsciously over the last 30 years. Only recently has what used to 
be called "decadence" become a more general possibility in our culture. Like the 
self-made man of American lore who out of good fortune managed to produce 
only indolent children, our culture is ill-prepared to deal with a problem that no 
one imagined would be a problem and that we are embarrassed to talk about se-
riously lest we be thought boorish or insensitive. While many of us may loath 
the unironic Tyler Durdcns in our midst when they claim, ''We're by-products of 
a lifestyle obsession .... What concerns [us] are celebrity magazines, televisions 
with 500 channels, some guy>s name on [our] underwear, Rogain, Viagra, 
Olestra," we ignore them at great peril. Like it or not, what Fitzgerald said 
about the rich, we can now say about many Americans-they're different. Once 
we realize this, we arc faced with three general choices regarding them: we can 
ignore them, indulge them, or confront them. The first strategy is the one I asso-
ciate with a failing contemporary American liberalism. The second strategy de-
scribes a post-liberal or bourgeois approach. The third is the strategy I associate 
with Mill anc..I trnc..litional liberalism. As Norton,s argument above makes clear, 
there arc numerous interests that benefit from the perpetual grasping and losing 
and grasping again. Ultimately, the silence on the question of the good life by 
thinkers and theorists c..loes not go unanswered, but rather is answered by those 
who arc either non-liberal or alibcral. As such, in America the "good life" most 
often gets mcrgec..I into what was once called the "high Life." 
Fight C/11b shows that this merger, this "bourgeoisification" of American cul-
ture, has failed to create the happiness of liberalism, but the film has apparently 
not found a reasonable substitute. Simply being anti-bourgeois leaves us in a void 
where we do not know what we arc for. It would have almost been a relief if the 
writers could have taken their "fascism" seriously as an alternative rather than 
mocking it-at least then there would have been something to talk about. As it is, 
however, there is no conversation or dialogue about anything; indeed, viewers are 
told, "The first rule of fight club is don't talk about fight club .... The second rule 
of project mayhem is c..lon't ask questions." So it is on the verge of his great nihil-
istic success that our protagonist kills the voice of Durden while simultaneously 
trying to kill himself. I fis road has led to nowhere and we are too polite, indiffer-
ent, or self-interested to suggest where else he might go. This is not friendship. 
Under a mistaken and expansive view of liberal neutrality, we leave our 
"Jacks" and "J ills," our "middle children of history" cum "Motorcycle boys and 
girls" in a monological cage from which we once had the ability, the right, and per-
haps even the duty to release them. r urthcrmorc, we impoverish ourselves be-
cause they, in turn, refrain from intervening in our lives and constructions of self. 
Liberalism, the selves it was designed to help nurture, and the happiness that was 
its end arc thus frustrated and eventually thwarted. Some form of "sermonic as-
sertion" or Socratic confrontation might have rescued us from the very thing we 
now leave in the hands of advertisers and other monologically inclined thinkers 
who have no interest in seeing us or anyone else saved. We (and the film itself) 
have answercc.J the question "how ought I to live?" with a shrug that symbolizes at 
worst "what do J care" and at best "it's not for me to say." 
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Conclusion 
In a 1940 essay in The New Rtp11blic titled "The Corruption of Liberalism," 
Lewis Mumford drew a sharp distinction between what he called "ideal liberal-
ism" and "pragmatic liberalism." Although he was writing about America's posi-
tion regarding WWII and American neutrality, I believe that his basic distinctions 
and arguments can be applied to our contemporary "spiritual war." Mumford ar-
gued that " liberals no longer act as if justice mattered, as if truth mattered, as if 
right mattered, as if humanity as a whole was any concern of theirs: the truth is 
they no lo nger dare to act" (568). Pointing to foundational thinkers like Voltaire 
and Rousseau, Mum ford traces the initial corruption of " ideal liberalism" to ex-
cessive concern with "the machinery of life" to the neglect of "csthctics, ethics, 
and religion" (569). T his excessive concern resulted in people who arc "uncon-
scious ... of the sources of their ethical ideas" and who "pick up more or lc1:1s 
what happens to be lying around them, without any effort at consistency or clarity 
... here a scrap left over from childhood, there a fragment of Kant or Bentham, 
o r again a dash of Machiavelli, pacifist Quakers one moment and quaking 
N ietzscheans the next" (569). To the " pragmatic liberal," the idea that there might 
be " internal obstacles to external improvement seemed absurd." 1 n turn, those 
same thinkers rejected the idea that "there was a field for imaginative design and 
rational discipline in the building of a personality as in the building of a sky-
scraper" (570). To wit, according to Mumfo rd, "immature personalities, irrational 
personalities, demoralized personal ities arc as inevitable as wccc.ls in an uncul ti-
vated garden when no deliberate attempt is made to provic.le a constructive basis 
for personal developmenr' (570). 
W hile for some this lack of effort is simply the proc.luct of indiffe rence or 
fear of confrontation, fo r others, incluc.ling contempo rary liberals, it is a principled 
position. Extrapolating from the assertion of neutrali ty o n the part of liberal 
states (Kukathas), liberal citizens fallaciously assume that they too arc rct1uircc.l to 
remain neutral and silent in the face of other citizens' choices and commitments 
or lack thereof. The no tion of "sermo nic assertion" is viewcc.l suspiciously as just 
ano ther form of quasi-authoritarian in tervention into another's right to pursue 
happiness. This is, o f course, an exact inversion of what l have argued is the ratio-
nale for liberalism in the first place, no t to mention an attempted transfiguration 
o f its dialogical nature. As Mumford himself puts it: "Liberalism, by and large, 
has prided itself upon its colorlessness and its emotional neutrality; and this liberal 
suspicion o f passion is partly responsible the liberal's inep titude for actio n" (571 ). 
To move beyond that "ineptitude" and meet the challenge of Fight C/11b, the right-
ful limits on the liberal state must be de-conflated from the inappropriately sclf-
imposed limitations on liberal citizens. failure to do so leaves a vacuum that, if in 
the unlikely event it is left unfilled, robs our friends in the liberal sta te of the 
chance to achieve true happiness. More likely, however, that vacuum will be filled 
by those who arc not " friends" of individual happiness, but arc instead commer-
cial partisans interested in their own pecuniary gain. 
Not only is "dialogical intervention," "scrmonic assertion," o r Socratic inter-
rogation perfectly consistent with the neutral liberal state, they arc exactly the in-
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tended outcome of limiting the state in such a way in the first place. Liberals 
could learn much by re-reading Aristotle's Ethics and then thinking about the 
difference between the phrases "self-intercsr' and "interest of a self" (Smith; 
Duncan). The commonplace political understanding of the first term suggests 
that each person readily knows "what's best for him or her," while the second 
should be seen as suggesting that selves may have certain interests that they can 
only come to know through learning vis-a-vis conversations with others and 
with various social "texts." A corrupted liberalism is one that has discarded the 
latter and carelessly reified the former; a healthy and historically grounded liber-
alism is one that will reverse this transfiguration. Will Kymlicka is right when 
he claims that in a liberal society "individuals must have the cultural conditions 
conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about the good life, and 
to acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and re-examine these views" 
(13). Without this, liberal happiness is not only elusive but, for many individu-
als, unattainable. The lives of such people wiJJ be metaphorically like Jack's 
when he looks to his apartment and laments: "A house fuJI of condiments and 
no fooc.l." Without dialogic or sermonic prodding toward a richer more fulfilling 
diet, America will continue to cat only the thinnish gruel of bourgeois life. If 
America's liberal citizenry or her theorists and intellectuals do not attempt to 
supply more substantial "liberal" nourishment to those living non-deliberatively 
anc.l, hence, in a state of perpetual spiritual hunger (Myers), they will undoubt-
ec.lly search elsewhere for "food." 1f the money holds up, chances are most will 
look to even more consumption for their spiritual "calories." However, increas-
ingly that will not suffice, at which point anything is possible. 
In a 1940 review of A1ei11 Kampf, George Orwell assets that Hitler "grasped 
the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life" (14). Though the context was dif-
ferent, I believe that his sentiments are still sound; he explains, "Socialism, and 
even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people 'I offer you a good 
time,' r fitler has saic.l to them 'I offer you struggle, danger and death,' and as a 
resul t a whole nation flings itself at his feet" (14). An older liberalism could 
meet such a challenge and win; I am not convinced that its contemporary itera-
tion in the work of some theorists and "practitioners" is as sound. 
Notes 
1. ln a response to the philosophic stance of Richard Rorty,Jean E lshtain makes a 
very important argument concerning the centrality of cer tain foundational ide-
als to the moral and even heroic actions of people in various historical situations 
like the I folocaust. I fer persuasive claim is that for the actors themselves, their 
actions make little sense if detached from the essentialist grounding or "first 
vocabularies" they assumed as the basis for taking action. E lshtain offers a chal-
lenge and a critique of those who would attempt to wholly deny or suppress 
those "first vocabularies": " ] t might be an interesting exercise for Rorty to re-
wri te the declaration of human rights so that it retains its power to condemn 
separate, and define yet abandons the basis on which it now docs so. Celebrating 
the c.lcclinc of religious faith, which served initially to underscore natural Jaw 
and natural right, Rorty wants to maintain and sustain the injunctions imbcdded 
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in such earlier formulations" (&o/ 333). 
2. While the literature surrounding this period is vast, the following arc among 
the most important and comprehensive works. Issac Kramnick's "Republican 
Revisionism Revisited" (1982); Robert E. Shalhope's "Republicanism and 
Early American I Iistoriography" (1982); Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological Origins 
of the A111erico11 Revo/11tio11; Gordon Wood's The Creation of the A111erico11 &p11b-
iic, 1776-1787 (1972); J. G. A. Pocock's The Mochiovellia11 NlomMI (1975); 
Thomas L. Pangle's The Spirit of Modem Rep11blico11ism (1988); Sheldon Wolin's 
The Presmce of the Post: Buoys 011 the State and Co11stil11tio11 (1990); Joshua 
Miller's The Rise 011d Foll of Democrory i11 A111erico, 1630-1789 (1991). 
3. See Isaiah Berlin's Fo11r Buoys 011 Uberty (1969); William A. Galston's Uberal 
P11rposes (1991) and "Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory" (1999); 
and Mkhacl Wal~er's Spheres of j11Jlice: A Defa11se of Pl11ralism a11d Bq11ality 
(1983). 
4. Aristotle argues in Book VI I J of the Ethics that "perfect friendship" is based 
upon desiring "the good of their friends for the friend's sake ... because each 
loves the other for what he is and not for any incidental quality" (263). 
5. Joseph Cropsey associated this process with the tcachingt; of Thomas I fobbes, 
who he argues taught a softer version of modernity's lesson than thinkers like 
Machiavelli by extolling the "virtues" of "survival, security, and freedom to cul-
tivate private and privately-felt predilections" (7) to the neglect of any greater or 
higher ambitions. Sec also Catherine Zuckert's "The Role of the Spiritedness in 
Politics" (1988). 
6. In an extended essay on the relationship between philosophy and politics, 
Hannah Arendt argues that "the plurality of men can never entirely be abol-
ished" because, "even if I were to live entirely by myself I would, aR long as I 
am alive, live in the condition of plurality. l have to put up with myself, and no-
where docs this I-with-myself show more clearly than in pure thought, always a 
dialogue between the two who I am" ("Philosophy and Politics" 86). 
7. On this point I take my cue from Charles Taylor, who in part takes his from 
Tocqucvillc's distinction between "individualism" and "egoism." At the root of 
the notion of the "examined life" is, I would argue, at least the possibility or rec-
ognition that one could be wrong about the mds he or she has selected and not 
just about the !lleo11s for achieving those ends. But, in either its "expressive" or 
its " possessive" form, liberalism cannot brook the sort of limits that arc implied 
by the notion that one could have been wrong about what one wanted because 
(tautological though it is) it was what one wanted then, even if one wants some-
thing else now. There is no need for conversation per sc but rather an announce-
ment or enactment of one's desires followed by the actions needed to achieve 
the desired ends. As Taylor puts it, " Freedom allows you to do what you want, 
and the greater application of instrumental reason gets you more of what you 
want, whatever it is" (21). 
8. Among the more important works in this vein arc Roberto Mangabcira Unger's 
IV10111iedge and Politics (1975); Michael J. Sandcl's Uberalis111 a11d the U11Jits of }11.flice 
(1982) and his edited volume Uberalislll and Its Critics (1984). Sec also, Robert N. 
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Bellah, ct. al., Habits of the Hearl: Individ11olislll a11d Commitment in American 
Ufa (1985) and Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virt11e (1984). 
9. Sec Stanley Fish's Doing lf/hot Comes Nat11ral!J (1989), "Mission Impossible: 
Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State" (1997) and There} No 
S11ch Thi11g as Free Speech (1994). Por an interesting response to much of this 
line of thought in Fish's work see J. Judd Owen's "Church and State in 
Stanley Fish's Antiliberalism." 
th 
10. Although the 10 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is often read in light 
of questions of federalism, i.e., the power of the national government versus 
the powers of the states, the last clause reserves powers not delegated to the 
people. Read as a communitarian or "republican" document rather than a lib-
ertarian one, the Bill of Rights, including this clause, should be seen as autho-
rizing exactly the sort of public confrontation on behalf of individual 
citizens that liberal constitutionaHsm denied initially to the national govern-
ment and subsequently to the states. 
11.Whilc it might be correctly pointed out that the movie itself is engaged in 
exactly the sort of cultural conversation I am arguing for when viewed from 
the perspective of the book's author (Chuck Palahniuk) or the film's director 
(David Fincher), the internal dynamic of the film or the "story" itself may be 
criticized for failing in its instructive, constructive or dialectical mission in 
such a way that it ends up at least partially reifying exactly what it was in-
tended to deconstruct. Perhaps one piece of admittedly anecdotal and cursory 
evidence that could sustain this line of thought were the instances of actual 
"fight clubs" that formed in the immediate wake of the movie, thereby strip-
ping the film in reality of the irony necessary to sustain its own 
deconstructivc effort. Indeed, upon hearing of such "clubs," I was reminded 
of the people's call to Nietzsche's Zarathustra "to make us into these last 
men" (130). To which he responded, as perhaps Palahniuk himself might 
have, "They understand me not: I am not mouth for these cars" (1 30). 
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American Spirit 
Rachna bunches her shoulders, exhaling a 
breath of sweetness from syrupy le.boa ga/11b jama11, 
her after school snack. She slumps in the kitchen 
chair while looking out the bay window, her com-
placent gaze serene like lotus flowers. She's forgot-
ten about the wrinkled notebook paper sandwiched 
between the pages of her spelling book Her body, 
dimpled with baby fat, shifts methodically, slightly 
rocking the feet of the chair. The house is still. 
Only Rachna and I arc home. While I fry Ranjeet's 
favorite meal for hot sticky days like today-spin-
ach and potato fried pakoras rubbed in curry 
toppled over sweet-smelling basmali rice-I see 
llachna from the corner of my eye, intermittently 
nursing the ball of her thumb in her lily-thin 
mouth. The Arizona blistering September heat 
rubs up against red-hot oil, splaying my skin with a 
clinging, indiscernible smell. 
"Rachna baby, what's wrong? 
"Mummy, when is Papa coming home?" 
" oon, beta. Only an hour or so more. Papa is 
very busy." 
"The Chevron is busy, Mummy? No, Papa 
promised he'd take me for pizza! Todcry. Ile said so 
yesterday at the store!" She throws her arms over 
her head in protest, her chapped lips ballooning 
into a pout. "I don't want Indian food! I want 
. I" plZZa 
"Ch11pl Quiet! tart your homework. Enough 
daydreaming. 'I'ime for news now. You sit with me 
or do your homework. Your choice." 
" it with youl" she bellows, her bright eyes 
snowy with anticipation. I turn off the wok; I have 
made plenty of pakoras for now. My body moves 
slowly to the living room couch, my ankles swollen 
and too heavy to hold me up. Rachna bounces like 
all happy little girls do, pulling at the hem of my 
sari. I Icr truthful, innocent eyes cannot grasp the 
week's terrifying ache. he says her schoolteacher 
talks about the twin towers collapsing and lets 
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